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discussions related to the recast of the Financial Regulation.
The second case, on the contrary, will show how the EP
can conduct unsuccessful negotiations, even in budgetary
politics such as the adoption of the Financial Perspectives,
when it does not (or cannot) choose the way of the linkage
of issues.
It will be demonstrated that it is mainly the ability of the
EP to link certain items of negotiation to its budgetary
powers and not simply its formal budgetary powers that
enables EP to stretch its powers in the EU decision making
process beyond formal procedures.
The extent of the powers of the European Parliament in The extent of the powers of the European Parliament in The extent of the powers of the European Parliament in The extent of the powers of the European Parliament in The extent of the powers of the European Parliament in
budgetary matters budgetary matters budgetary matters budgetary matters budgetary matters
The decision making process in budgetary matters in the
European Union is characterised by a specific division of
competences between two budgetary authorities, the Council
and the European Parliament. The balance of powers
between Council and EP varies according to the moment in
the budgetary cycle.
If one looks carefully at the Financial Perspectives, which
constitute the financial framework of the Community where
the big envelope of Community resources and expenditures
is agreed, the European Council undoubtedly has a stronger
role than the EP: the power to establish them constitutes in
fact one of the main components of the power of political
impetus defined in Art. 4 of the Treaty on European Union.
Its authority, furthermore, guarantees that the financial
framework set by the Financial Perspectives will be respected,
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The budget of the European Union is implemented according to the provisions of the Financial
Regulation. The adoption of the latest Financial Regulation, in December 2006, has shown,
once again, how the EP is able to reinforce its role in the decision making process by wielding
its budgetary powers.
However, the negotiation of the EU financial framework for 2007-2013 has also shown that in
budgetary politics the EP is not necessarily successful in imposing its view on the other institutions.
The paper will demonstrate that the key for success for the EP resides indeed not just in the
budgetary power it holds, but in linking wisely specific subjects of negotiation to the budgetary
procedures where it has more discretion. The linkage of issues might then constitute a “weapon”
for the EP to force the other institutions to accept its requests concerning matters that it negotiates
with those institutions.
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
In the literature on EU inter-institutional relations, extensive
analysis has been provided on the ability of the European
Parliament (EP) to extend its powers beyond formal
procedures.1 This means that the EP occasionally manages
to influence the decision making process more strongly
than formal procedures would have normally allowed. In
fact, the EP has shown to be able to influence the decision
making process within the EU both by leading the other
political actors to negotiate on the basis of “pre-cooked”
choices,2 or, in many cases by using its budgetary powers
wisely.3 The present article aims at continuing this latter line
of interpretation, by exploring strategies and practices
developed and used by the EP to increase its power through
applying its rights as budgetary authority.
Then the powers of negotiation of the EP will be
analysed focusing on procedures where it has only limited
formal power to impose its views but where it can influence
the decision making process by cleverly linking issues in the
overall political process, using as a basis its powers as
budgetary authority.4 For this purpose, two case-studies will
be presented, respectively the procedure for the adoption
of the Financial Regulation and that of the Financial
Perspectives.
Notably the former case will show a recent example of
success for the EP in negotiating amendments to the
Financial Regulation. It will be shown that the key element
of success for the European Parliament in this case rested
in its ability to link the adoption of the annual budget to the
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as has been always the case.
As for the adoption of the annual budget of the
Community, the Parliament has the last word over the so-
called “Non-compulsory expenditures” (NCE)5 within the
ceilings established in the financial perspectives, whereas
the Council has the last word over the Compulsory
Expenditures (CE).6
Finally, when establishing detailed rules for the
implementation of the budget, through Financial Regulations
and Implementing Rules, the EP is only consulted, yet with
the guarantee of a special form of “conciliation”, as the first
case-study will show. However, the EP has a power of
control over the Commission when managing and
implementing the budget,
through the so-called “dis-
charge” procedure.7
These specific divisions
of competences among the
three EU institutions in the
budgetary process indicate
that inter-institutional bar-
gains have special import-
ance in the budgetary field.
Since 1970, the Parliament
has had the right to decide
on expenditures arising from
political choices of which it
was not the author (not being
a full co-legislator), and it
has always used the budget
as a means to pressure the
Council and affirm its posi-
tion in inter-institutional
debates. As a consequence,
the Member States have
always tried to limit the EP’s attempts to increase its power
by reducing the quantity of resources available to the EU
and by keeping a fairly tight control over those resources.
Therefore, only an overall analysis of EP budgetary
powers can give a precise overview of its strength vis-à-vis
the other institutions, and especially the Council, since it is
mostly through the linkage of different issues that the EP
manages to maximise its powers as a budgetary authority.
The case: the new Financial Regulation The case: the new Financial Regulation The case: the new Financial Regulation The case: the new Financial Regulation The case: the new Financial Regulation
The background
Council Regulation 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation
(FR) applicable to the general budget of the European
Communities was until December 2006 the instrument to
implement the budget of the European Communities, as
laid down in the EC Treaty (Art. 279 TEC).
It set forth principles and rules governing the Community
budget (such as transparency or sound financial
management) and laid down more detailed provisions on
management of Community funds (such as conditions for
the award of grants or contracts, rules on accounting, etc.).
This Regulation was adopted by the Council by unanimity
(Qualified Majority Voting after 1 January 2007) on the
basis of a Commission proposal and following consultation
with the European Parliament.
Furthermore, technical arrangements for the
implementation of the FR were to be adopted by the
Commission through the so-called Implementing Rules
(IR).
According to Art. 184 of the FR, it shall be modified every
three years, or whenever it is necessary. In May 2005 the
Commission presented a proposal to amend Council
Regulation 1605/2002. The purpose was to insert provisions
concerning an increase in transparency and efficiency in
the application of financial rules, establishing simpler
procedures for access to funds and grants, providing for
automatic release of reserve money for all basic acts
adopted during the budgetary year and granting more
autonomy to the Commission when transferring
appropriations8 (especially concerning staff expenditure).
In accordance with Art. 179 TEC (regulating the procedure
for the adoption of the FR), the Commission’s proposal was
submitted to the European
Parliament for consultation
and to the Court of Auditors
for an opinion.
However, Art. 184 of the
FR also provides that at the
request of the EP, a special
“conciliation” procedure
may take place in order to
review the Regulation. The
meaning of this conciliation
(“concertation” in the French
version) is contained in the
Joint Declaration of 1975
on budgetary discipline,
which foresees a special
trialogue procedure in case
of budgetary conflict. Fur-
thermore, this interpretation
is confirmed by Art. 45 of
the Inter-institutional Agree-
ment on budgetary pro-
cedure of 17 May 2006, which establishes that the Financial
Regulation “should be adopted in accordance with the
conciliation procedure established by the Joint Declaration
[...] of 4 March 1975, in the spirit which enabled agreement
in 2002”.
The Joint Declaration of 1975, indeed, has been one of
the first examples of the use of “soft law” instruments to
solve conflicts between the institutions, especially in
controversial fields such as the budget. While the legal
force of the inter-institutional agreements may be
controversial,9 it also constitutes a solution for endless
conflicts among the Institutions in budgetary matters. The
power of the Parliament in the amendment procedure of
the FR can thus be defined as a sort of “reinforced
consultation”, in which the letter of the treaty is supplemented
by an atypical act to which the Institutions have showed the
will to bind themselves.10
With this in mind, it is interesting then to observe how the
EP made use of both the “reinforced consultation” mentioned
above, as well as its more general budgetary power, in
order to “force” the Council to include some of its
amendments in the Financial Regulations.
The EP reply
The Budget Committee of the EP (whose Rapporteur on this
dossier was the German MEP Ms Grässle) proposed several
amendments to the Commission proposal. These concerned,
among others, the division of competences between the FR
and the IR (adopted by the Commission),11 the introduction
of the principles of proportionality and effective and efficient
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internal control into the FR and the following points:
• more transparency and efficiency in the application of
financial rules, through the establishment of a database
of names of all beneficiaries,
• automatic release of reserves12 for all basic acts adopted
during the budgetary year, which were not foreseen
when adopting the annual budget.13 The Parliament
rejected the automatic release of “provisions” reserves,
(established to cover
cases not foreseen by the
annual budget) where a
basic act enters into force
after the adoption of the
annual budget since it
would allow the legislator
(the Council in case of
consultation procedure)
to decide on the allo-
cation of resources with-
out the consultation of
the Parliament (Artt. 23,
49 FR),
• autonomous power of
decision for the Commission for transfers of
appropriations concerning staff expenditure, within the
limit of 3% of the appropriations of the year.
The Council view and the inter-institutional dialogue
On the procedural side, the Council wished to respect the
legal procedures foreseen for the review of the Regulation,
as respect of the formal procedure would have ensured a
more prominent role for the Council. Moreover, in its view,
the “reinforced consultation” procedure and the trialogue
would have been sufficient to guarantee a coordination of
positions among the Institutions.
On the content side, the Council, although in principle
it supported the Commission’s proposal, wished nevertheless
to limit the autonomy of the Commission to authorise
additional expenditure for its administrative staff, and to
cancel the provision requiring the publication of the names
of beneficiaries of EU funds and grants, especially under
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
The position of the Council was therefore different from
that of the Parliament, for whom, however, the
straightforward use of the “reinforced conciliation”
procedure would not guarantee the acceptance of their
amendments by the Council.
As in numerous other
cases, then, the EP linked
the negotiations for the
amendment of the FR to the
negotiations leading to the
adoption of the annual
budget. Therefore, in the
same conciliation proced-
ure, the two issues were
discussed together. In these
combined negotiations, the
EP threatened to cut 50% of
the Council’s desired ex-
penditure on the Common
Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and to transfer expenditures
for Special Representatives to Chapter V (administrative
expenditures), with a view to abolishing them altogether in
the future. Expenditures for CFSP operations and for
administration, in fact, fall, surprisingly, under the category
of non-compulsory expenditures (NCE), over which the EP
has the final word when adopting the annual budget, even
though they are of special importance for Member States.
As for the Commission, finally, since the EP supported
its proposals for an increase in administrative staff and
autonomy when mobilizing reserves, it integrated most of
the EP’s amendments, creating a basis for negotiation
more favorable to its needs, sometimes even against the
Council position.
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The final outcome
The new Financial Regulation (Council Reg. 1995/2006
amending Reg. 1605/2002), adopted on 13 December
2006, contains the main elements of the final outcome of
this negotiation process.
As for transparency, it is foreseen now in the recast
Financial Regulation to implement, through sectoral
regulations, the provision concerning publication of the
names of the final beneficiaries of funds, as requested by
the EP. Moreover, the Commission has undertaken through
the adoption of the Implementing Rules to set up a database
on beneficiaries.
The results of this are already becoming apparent, e.g.
in the current negotiations to amend Regulation 1290/
2005 on the financing of the CAP, where Member States
seem to agree for ex-post publication of information
concerning the beneficiaries of Community funds.14
The Parliament did not get the power to be consulted in
case of modification of the Implementing Rules, even
though the Commission accepted to introduce a provision
pertaining thereto in its amended proposal before the
trialogue.
As for the automatic
release, EP concerns have
been taken into account,
since it is allowed now only
in case of legal acts adopted
in co-decision, so that the EP
keeps the power of control
over budgetary decisions
when it has limited powers
as legislative authority (for
instance, in the case of a
consultation procedure)
The Commission obtain-
ed the power, during the last
month of the financial year,
to decide autonomously on
transfers of appropriations
concerning staff expend-
iture, within a limit of 3% of
the appropriations of the
year.
Therefore, the Council accepted many of the EP’s
amendments, such as an increased respect of principles of
transparency and proportionality (through the publication
of names of beneficiaries, for instance), and some
guarantees of respect of its role as budgetary and legislative
authority (by deleting the provision on automatic release of
reserve, for instance). As for EP concerns on Commission’s
autonomy, the latter committed itself to take into account
the EP’s concerns in the daily implementation of the
financial rules.
When the “reinforced consultation” is not enough: the When the “reinforced consultation” is not enough: the When the “reinforced consultation” is not enough: the When the “reinforced consultation” is not enough: the When the “reinforced consultation” is not enough: the
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Since 1988, resources and expenditures of the European
Communities are framed into a multi-annual planning
instrument, called Financial Perspectives. They take the
form of an inter-institutional agreement, adopted
consensually by the three Institutions, even though, at the
end of the process, the final act needs to be adopted by the
Heads of State or Government in the European Council.
The adoption of the financial framework 2007-2013
has proven to be particularly difficult in the framework of an
enlarged and more complex European Union, given the
sensitivity of issues such as the reform of the CAP and the
future of the UK rebate.
In December 2003, in fact, the six net contributors,
Austria, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden and
the United Kingdom sent a letter to the Commission and
requested that the future financial framework should not be
higher than approximately 1% of EU Gross National
Income (GNI).
In February the Commission published a proposal for
the new multi-annual framework 2007-2013 in which it
was envisaged that, on the contrary, the Union resources
would be retained at 1.24% max of EU GNI,15 and the
European Parliament supported this approach by insisting
on the need for the Union to have sufficient resources to
deliver on its policies.
The Brussels Summit of June 2005 produced some
dramatic headlines as the EU leaders were unable to reach
agreement. Finally, at the Brussels summit of December
2005 the EU Council brokered an agreement for a sum
total of €862 billion, corresponding to a level of 1.045% of
GNI. This was clearly lower
than what the Commission
had proposed and what the
European Parliament had
supported on a number of
occasions.16
The European Parliament
had in fact asked for an
additional 14 billion Euro to
finance cohesion policy
initiatives such as Galileo
and Natura 2000. As a
consequence of not getting
its way, the EP threatened to
block the adoption of an
agreement and thus to leave
the European Union without
a financial framework for
the immediate future if the
Council were to refuse to
accept its amendments.
At the end of a marathon seven-hour meeting on 4 April
2006, the three institutions agreed a deal on the Financial
Perspective for 2007-2013 in which an extra €4 billion was
supported by the Council for programmes and initiatives
regarded as priorities by the EP delegation.
This compromise was much less than desired by the EP
and many MEPs were unable to hide their disappointment,
even though the official statement maintained that “it was
the only possible compromise that Parliament could achieve,
within the magnitude of the negotiations, for a multi-
annual Budget with a view to guaranteeing the continuity of
EU legislation, ensuring sound financial management of
EU funding and maintaining Parliament’s legislative and
budgetary powers over the next period”.17
The negotiations were indeed long and complicated.
On a number of occasions, the EP threatened to block the
adoption of the inter-institutional agreement if the Council
wanted to insist on the cut on EU resources, among other
things. Nevertheless, the inter-institutional agreement,
lacking a formal binding power, does not guarantee any
special and formal power to the European Parliament.
Thus it seems that the best option for the EP of influencing
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the decision making process remains the linkage of any
specific negotiation to other issues where it can enjoy
stronger budgetary rights. In this specific case however,
there was no linkage of issues: in such broad and important
negotiations, there was no possibility for the EP to link the
approval of the financial package to other issues.
Even the additional €4 billion that the EP managed to
secure at the last minute to fund its priority programmes can
be understood as a somewhat predictable victory, confined
nonetheless within the framework of the “formal power”
that the EP already holds. In fact, the inter-institutional
agreement represents a forum for discussion and negotiation
in which the EP can expect to gain “some” of its demands
from the Council, and therefore, not surprisingly, the EP
was able to see some of its requests satisfied.
Thus, the result of the negotiation for the adoption of the
Financial Perspectives represents neither an example in
which the EP was able to exert its influence beyond its formal
role, nor a victory as some MEP tried to claim, for clear
political reasons, in the aftermath of the compromise.
Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions
The two cases presented have served as examples of how
the EP uses its budgetary powers in the complex negotiations
that form the inter-institutional relationship. Although at
first glance these powers may appear constrained (a lack
of EP power on the revenue side, limits on the NCE, and
ceilings provided by the financial perspectives in which the
Council is the dominant power), the EP wields them as a
“weapon” at times of inter-institutional conflict.
More than the budgetary power per se, in fact, it is the
tactical use of its rights in the whole budgetary process that
have proven to be most successful in achieving the influence
over other issues that the EP seeks.
The main lessons to draw are therefore threefold: firstly,
it is confirmed that its budgetary powers provide the EP with
a very useful tool for asserting its role in the general
decision making process within the EU.
Secondly, this tool becomes notably relevant when the
EP is able to link some specific items of negotiation to its
budgetary power, so that the latter becomes a “threat” for
the other institutions. The linkage of issues entails that
political and diverse issues that are usually not analysed
together are brought into focus together by the centrifugal
forces of the EP’s strong budgetary powers.
Thirdly, budgetary politics are a multi-faceted
phenomenon that go beyond Treaty provisions and
mathematical calculations. The interaction between
institutions in this field, in fact, is not limited to single
discussion chains or to the individual procedures ostensibly
involved, but appears rather as a continuum or inter-woven
chains, and only by observing it as an overall cycle is it
possible to understand the extent of the power of the
individual institutions.
Moreover, the EP has proven able to use the budget as
a means of elaborating and asserting norms of public
control, and not just as a weapon of obtaining concessions
in other fields. For example, the insistence on inserting the
principle of proportionality in the recast Financial Regulation
is also a means for the EP to assert a basic principle of public
administration and to secure a better implementation of the
norms. Or, for example, the rule of unity, for which there
should be one single budget for all the expenditures and
revenues of the Community, has been used on several
occasions by the EP to include all operations in the budget
(especially those falling under Pillar II and III) in order to
have a broader impact upon the decision making process.
Even though the victories of the EP are the fruits of
compromise, and therefore are weakened by long
negotiations and battles with the Council and Commission,
it is worth analysing these successes in light of this ability to
link issues with its budgetary power. It is likely, in fact, that
even where it is able to obtain new formal powers, the EP
will continue to “exploit” its budgetary advantage in all
cases where its powers are otherwise limited.
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Round-table held in Vilnius, Lithuania, on 12 October 2007. The discussion focused both on the general issues of
the budget review and the Lithuanian perspective.
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